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A	  Tale	  of	  Two	  SICs:	  Japanese	  and	  American	  Industrialization	  in	  Historical	  Perspective	  
Abstract	  Late	  developing	  countries	  are	  able	  to	  adopt	  best	  practice	  technologies	  pioneered	  abroad,	  allowing	  more	  rapid	  convergence	  toward	  leading	  economies.	  Meiji	  Japan	  (1868-­‐1912)	  is	  considered	  a	  successful	  example	  of	  industrial	  convergence,	  but	  much	  of	  the	  evidence	  relies	  on	  national	  aggregates	  or	  selected	  industries.	  Using	  historical	  industry	  data,	  this	  paper	  examines	  whether	  Japan	  adopted	  new	  technologies	  faster	  compared	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  Contrary	  to	  conventional	  wisdom,	  duration	  analysis	  indicates	  that	  new	  sectors	  did	  not	  appear	  relatively	  sooner	  in	  Japan;	  however,	  they	  did	  grow	  to	  economic	  significance	  faster.	  Higher	  firm	  capitalization	  and	  capital	  intensity	  are	  also	  associated	  with	  earlier	  entry	  for	  Japanese	  sectors.	  
Keywords:	  convergence,	  industry	  classification,	  survival	  analysis,	  technology	  adoption	  and	  diffusion	  JEL	  codes:	  N11,	  N15,	  O14,	  O33	  
Acknowledgements:	  The	  author	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Ann	  Carlos,	  Tim	  Hatton,	  Alfonso	  Herranz-­‐Loncan,	  David	  Weil,	  Jeff	  Williamson;	  two	  anonymous	  referees;	  and	  participants	  at	  the	  Asian	  Historical	  Economic	  Conference,	  the	  Australasian	  Cliometrics	  Workshop,	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  Economic	  and	  Business	  History	  conference,	  the	  World	  Economic	  History	  Congress,	  and	  seminars	  at	  Universidad	  de	  Carlos	  Tercero,	  Universitat	  de	  Barcelona,	  and	  University	  of	  Sussex.	  Shigeo	  Morita	  and	  Jun	  Imaki	  provided	  diligent	  research	  assistance,	  and	  the	  Australian	  Research	  Council	  (project	  DE120101426)	  provided	  funding	  for	  this	  research.	  	  
	   2	  
Between	  1870	  and	  1900,	  the	  United	  States	  saw	  a	  three-­‐fold	  increase	  in	  the	  value-­‐added	  of	  manufacturing,	  with	  its	  share	  of	  national	  output	  rising	  four	  per	  cent	  over	  the	  period	  to	  just	  under	  a	  fifth	  of	  total	  income	  (United	  States	  Bureau	  of	  the	  Census	  1975).	  While	  this	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  American	  industry	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  to	  the	  country's	  economic	  leadership	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  no	  less	  remarkable	  was	  the	  catch	  up	  of	  other	  late	  developing	  countries,	  particularly	  Japan.	  Starting	  from	  a	  much	  smaller	  base,	  Japanese	  industry	  also	  grew	  apace,	  with	  manufacturing's	  share	  of	  national	  income	  increasing	  four	  per	  cent	  between	  1885	  and	  1900,	  and	  another	  three	  per	  cent	  the	  following	  decade	  to	  reach	  18.5	  per	  cent	  in	  1910	  (Japan	  Statistical	  Agency	  2007).	  In	  effect,	  what	  took	  the	  United	  States	  three	  decades	  was	  achieved	  by	  Japan	  in	  half	  the	  time,	  with	  even	  more	  dramatic	  catch-­‐up	  compared	  to	  earlier	  industrializers	  like	  the	  United	  Kingdom.1	  As	  with	  other	  late	  developing	  countries,	  Japan	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  accelerate	  its	  development	  by	  adopting	  technologies	  at	  their	  current	  best	  practice,	  also	  known	  as	  technological	  convergence	  or	  leapfrogging.	  This	  process,	  identified	  with	  Alexander	  Gerschenkron's	  (1962)	  theory	  of	  economic	  backwardness,	  allows	  for	  potential	  savings	  in	  time	  and	  resources	  for	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.2	  While	  many	  small-­‐scale,	  traditional	  industries	  continued	  to	  be	  important	  over	  this	  period,	  some	  of	  these	  (e.g.,	  silk	  reeling,	  food	  processing)	  and	  novel	  sectors	  (e.g.,	  chemicals,	  railroads)	  benefitted	  from	  international	  market	  access	  and	  mechanization.	  Furthermore,	  policymakers	  are	  able	  to	  target	  industries	  that	  may	  have	  a	  relative	  comparative	  advantage	  and	  for	  entrepreneurs	  to	  compete	  with	  established	  foreign	  producers	  in	  local	  and	  possibly	  international	  markets.	  This	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  the	  case	  for	  leading	  Japanese	  sectors	  like	  railroads	  and	  cotton	  textiles	  that	  used	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  equipment	  and	  production	  techniques	  (Tang	  2014;	  Saxonhouse	  1974).	  Less	  is	  clear	  is	  whether	  the	  country's	  path	  to	  industrialization	  can	  generally	  be	  described	  as	  asynchronous	  for	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole	  or	  if	  adoption	  was	  ad	  hoc	  and	  specific	  to	  certain	  industries.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  "In	  England	  the	  factory	  system	  evolved	  over	  two	  centuries	  or	  more;	  in	  Japan	  it	  was	  established	  in	  fifty	  years,	  or	  even	  less"	  (Lockwood	  1954,	  p.	  187).	  2	  "[T]he	  higher	  the	  degree	  of	  backwardness,	  the	  more	  discontinuous	  the	  development	  is	  likely	  to	  be"	  (Gerschenkron	  1962,	  p.	  45).	  Some	  constraints	  to	  acquiring	  frontier	  technologies	  include	  the	  size	  of	  industrial	  investments,	  available	  production	  inputs,	  and	  prevailing	  institutional	  frameworks	  may	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  non-­‐linear	  adoption	  and	  economic	  development.	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While	  numerous	  studies	  have	  examined	  economic	  convergence	  between	  leaders	  and	  laggards,	  few	  examine	  the	  actual	  timing	  or	  dimensions	  of	  technological	  catch-­‐up.	  Do	  increased	  labour	  productivity	  or	  the	  number	  of	  steam	  engines	  used	  in	  a	  given	  sector	  constitute	  sufficient	  statistics	  to	  assess	  industrial	  advancement	  or	  economic	  policies?	  How	  can	  different	  types	  of	  technologies	  and	  sectors	  be	  measured	  and	  compared	  without	  loss	  of	  generality?	  These	  issues,	  difficult	  by	  themselves	  within	  a	  single	  economy,	  are	  magnified	  when	  making	  international	  comparisons	  that	  cross	  time	  and	  space.	  Japan's	  industrial	  development	  in	  the	  Meiji	  Period	  (1868-­‐1912),	  however,	  provides	  a	  unique	  context	  to	  analyse	  the	  dynamics	  of	  technology	  adoption	  due	  to	  its	  relative	  isolation	  prior	  to	  its	  integration	  into	  the	  world	  economy	  and	  the	  observed	  introduction	  of	  foreign	  technologies	  thereafter.	  This	  paper	  takes	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  measuring	  the	  relative	  speed	  of	  technology	  adoption	  and	  diffusion	  compared	  to	  earlier	  scholarship,	  and	  does	  so	  using	  official	  industrial	  statistics	  from	  Japan	  and	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century.	  For	  both	  countries,	  this	  period	  of	  time	  coincided	  with	  major	  waves	  of	  industrial	  development,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Japan,	  its	  initial	  industrial	  transition.	  That	  said,	  given	  their	  significant	  differences	  in	  factor	  endowments,	  institutions,	  and	  other	  economic	  features,	  making	  cross-­‐country	  comparisons	  can	  be	  problematic.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  I	  make	  two	  important	  simplifying	  assumptions:	  that	  individual	  industries	  embody	  specific	  technologies,	  which	  may	  overlap	  but	  not	  in	  their	  entirety;	  and	  that	  the	  chronology	  of	  an	  industry's	  appearance	  and	  growth	  approximates	  the	  embodied	  technologies'	  adoption	  and	  diffusion,	  respectively.	  	  Unlike	  data	  measuring	  different	  types	  of	  technology,	  which	  are	  not	  consistently	  recorded	  across	  countries	  or	  can	  be	  easily	  compared	  and	  aggregated	  across	  sectors,	  data	  for	  industries	  are	  more	  readily	  available.	  These	  official	  series,	  which	  include	  figures	  on	  establishments	  and	  industry	  capitalization,	  allow	  one	  to	  identify	  when	  sectors	  appeared	  in	  both	  countries	  and	  grew	  in	  economic	  importance	  and	  thus	  measure	  relative	  technological	  convergence.	  To	  make	  comparison,	  I	  standardize	  the	  classification	  of	  the	  two	  countries'	  industries	  to	  a	  single	  system	  based	  on	  the	  1987	  U.S.	  Standard	  Industrial	  Classification	  (SIC),	  and	  any	  relative	  differences	  may	  in	  turn	  demonstrate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Japan	  engaged	  in	  technological	  leapfrogging	  relative	  to	  a	  recognized	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industrial	  leader	  (Statistics	  Bureau	  of	  Japan	  2009;	  United	  States	  Bureau	  of	  Labor	  Statistics	  2014).3	  	  Estimates	  from	  duration	  model	  analysis	  show	  substantial	  differences	  in	  the	  respective	  industrial	  development	  of	  the	  two	  countries	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Consistent	  with	  Gerschenkronian	  backwardness,	  per	  capita	  income	  levels	  were	  inversely	  correlated	  with	  the	  speed	  of	  adoption	  in	  general	  for	  both	  Japan	  and	  the	  United	  States;	  in	  other	  words,	  both	  countries	  adopted	  new	  technologies	  more	  rapidly	  when	  they	  were	  at	  an	  earlier	  stage	  of	  development.	  However,	  benchmarked	  against	  the	  United	  States,	  new	  manufacturing	  sectors	  do	  not	  appear	  in	  Japan	  relatively	  earlier	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  emerge	  later.	  In	  both	  countries,	  but	  especially	  true	  for	  Japan,	  industries	  with	  larger	  firms	  are	  associated	  with	  faster	  introduction.	  Furthermore,	  unlike	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  a	  lower	  share	  of	  capital	  among	  related	  sectors	  and	  higher	  capital	  intensity	  both	  appear	  to	  speed	  up	  technology	  adoption.	  	  In	  contrast,	  for	  industries	  that	  became	  economically	  significant,	  defined	  as	  those	  attaining	  at	  least	  half	  a	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  manufacturing	  capital	  stock,	  Japanese	  industries	  passed	  the	  threshold	  more	  quickly	  than	  those	  in	  the	  U.S.	  This	  result	  obtains	  even	  though	  both	  per	  capita	  income	  levels	  and	  firm	  size	  become	  directly	  correlated	  with	  economic	  significance	  (i.e.,	  richer	  countries	  pass	  the	  capital	  share	  threshold	  sooner).	  Results	  for	  both	  new	  industry	  entry	  and	  industry	  significance	  are	  robust	  to	  different	  specifications,	  although	  higher	  capital	  thresholds	  weaken	  the	  significance	  of	  faster	  Japanese	  industrialization.	  As	  a	  whole,	  these	  results	  add	  to	  the	  newer	  body	  of	  research	  that	  questions	  whether	  Japanese	  industrialization	  was	  based	  simply	  on	  accelerated	  adoption	  and	  diffusion	  of	  foreign	  technologies.	  In	  particular,	  by	  controlling	  for	  industry	  characteristics	  and	  differentiating	  between	  sector	  appearance	  and	  their	  rise	  to	  economic	  importance,	  the	  two	  phenomena	  of	  adoption	  and	  diffusion	  exhibit	  significant	  differences.	  Relative	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  new	  technologies	  in	  Japan	  were	  adopted	  more	  slowly,	  but	  once	  introduced	  spread	  more	  quickly	  through	  the	  economy.	  One	  possible	  explanation	  may	  be	  that	  the	  industry	  classification	  system	  is	  too	  coarse	  to	  capture	  small-­‐scale	  innovation	  and	  entrepreneurship,	  and	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  individuals	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Strictly	  speaking,	  neither	  country	  had	  a	  standardized	  industrial	  classification	  system	  before	  the	  1930s,	  with	  the	  United	  States	  issuing	  its	  first	  classification	  system	  in	  1941	  while	  Japan	  did	  the	  same	  in	  1949.	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independent	  firms	  were	  more	  innovative	  than	  the	  largest	  ones	  better	  captured	  in	  the	  official	  statistics	  (Nicholas	  2011;	  Tang	  2011).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  given	  the	  relative	  concentration	  of	  firms	  in	  Japanese	  industries,	  larger	  firms	  may	  have	  been	  able	  to	  standardize	  application	  of	  new	  production	  techniques	  more	  effectively,	  which	  is	  supported	  by	  more	  recent	  studies	  on	  managerial	  practices	  (Braguinsky	  et	  al	  2015).	  These	  interpretations,	  and	  the	  data	  and	  analysis	  underlying	  them,	  are	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  sections.	  	   HISTORICAL	  CONTEXT	  AND	  LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  In	  his	  theory	  of	  late	  development,	  Gerschenkron	  identified	  Germany	  and	  Russia	  as	  having	  industrialized	  with	  unusual	  rapidity	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Writing	  that	  "[i]ndustrialization	  always	  seemed	  the	  more	  promising	  the	  greater	  the	  backlog	  of	  technological	  innovations	  which	  the	  backward	  country	  could	  take	  over	  from	  the	  more	  advanced	  country"	  (Gerschenkron	  1962,	  p.	  8),	  he	  credits	  their	  achievement	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  adopt	  pre-­‐existing	  technologies	  developed	  by	  industrial	  pioneers	  like	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  United	  States.	  This	  observation	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  an	  extensive	  literature	  on	  economic	  convergence	  that	  measures	  differences	  in	  national	  income,	  productivity,	  capitalization,	  and	  institutions	  (Abramovitz	  1986;	  Baumol	  1986;	  Benetrix	  et	  al	  2015;	  Delong	  1988;	  Rodrik	  2013;	  Sokoloff	  and	  Engerman	  2000).	  Until	  the	  mid	  nineteenth	  century,	  Japan	  was	  an	  economy	  organized	  along	  feudal	  lines	  and	  engaged	  primarily	  in	  traditional	  agricultural	  production	  (Ohkawa	  and	  Rosovsky	  1973).	  This	  changed	  markedly	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century,	  following	  the	  country's	  (forced)	  opening	  to	  the	  international	  economy.	  In	  1868,	  the	  year	  of	  the	  Meiji	  Restoration,	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  gross	  national	  output	  came	  from	  primary	  sector	  production;	  by	  1905,	  this	  share	  fell	  to	  under	  forty	  per	  cent,	  similar	  to	  the	  proportion	  coming	  from	  a	  swiftly	  growing	  textile	  manufacturing	  industry	  (ibid,	  p.	  15).	  Even	  with	  these	  gains,	  Japan	  remained	  in	  absolute	  measures	  significantly	  behind	  industrial	  leaders	  like	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  the	  relative	  disparity	  had	  narrowed.	  Table	  1	  presents	  some	  measures	  of	  economic	  activity	  for	  both	  Japan	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  [Table	  1]	  Similar	  to	  the	  experiences	  of	  other	  successful	  late	  developing	  countries,	  Japan's	  modernization	  is	  attributed	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  foreign	  technologies,	  increased	  capital	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accumulation,	  and	  higher	  levels	  of	  productivity,	  although	  the	  analyses	  typically	  rely	  on	  national	  aggregates	  or	  are	  not	  empirically	  verified.4	  A	  visible	  example	  of	  foreign	  technology	  adoption	  was	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  railroad	  in	  the	  early	  1870s,	  which	  expanded	  rapidly	  in	  the	  next	  three	  decades	  and	  linked	  population	  areas,	  provided	  access	  to	  natural	  resources,	  and	  increased	  firm	  scale	  (Tang	  2014).5	  Recent	  scholarship	  confirms	  Japan's	  precocity	  among	  countries	  in	  the	  industrial	  periphery,	  with	  growth	  rates	  exceeding	  the	  leading	  economies	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  Germany	  starting	  in	  the	  1890s	  and	  continuing	  for	  most	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  (Benetrix	  et	  al	  2015).6	  	  Notwithstanding	  the	  insight	  gained	  from	  estimating	  industrial	  growth	  rates	  and	  aggregate	  productivity	  levels,	  what	  remain	  unclear	  are	  the	  specific	  mechanisms	  underlying	  economic	  convergence	  as	  well	  as	  which	  industries	  are	  affected	  and	  how	  sectoral	  differences	  can	  be	  measured.7	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Meiji	  Japan,	  besides	  transportation	  infrastructure,	  numerous	  studies	  have	  identified	  other	  contributing	  factors	  to	  its	  industrial	  take-­‐off,	  such	  as	  public	  investment,	  entrepreneurial	  capital,	  and	  financial	  market	  access,	  and	  management	  practices	  (Braguinsky	  et	  al	  2015;	  Morck	  and	  Nakamura	  2007;	  Rousseau	  1999;	  Tang	  2011,	  2013).8	  Technological	  change	  may	  also	  have	  benefitted	  from	  a	  Japanese	  marketplace	  that	  rewarded	  independent	  innovators,	  who	  took	  advantage	  of	  (and	  were	  rewarded	  by)	  the	  country's	  newly	  established	  patent	  system	  to	  introduce	  new	  technologies	  (Nicholas	  2011).	  Besides	  their	  introduction,	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Other	  possible	  influences	  not	  directly	  related	  to	  technology	  adoption	  include	  Japan's	  high	  absorptive	  capacity	  due	  in	  part	  to	  its	  "well-­‐functioning	  sociopolitical	  infrastructure"	  (Ohkawa	  and	  Rosovsky	  1973,	  p.	  39)	  and	  the	  economic	  consequences	  of	  market	  integration	  (Lockwood	  1954,	  pp.	  17-­‐18).	  	  5	  Railroads	  were	  also	  heavily	  utilized	  in	  Japan's	  military	  victories	  against	  China	  (1895)	  and	  Russia	  (1905),	  which	  provided	  the	  country	  with	  its	  first	  colonial	  possessions,	  reparations,	  and	  international	  status.	  Military	  success	  also	  increased	  Japan's	  debt	  capacity	  and	  access	  to	  international	  capital	  markets	  (Sussman	  and	  Yafeh	  2000).	  6	  While	  Japan	  was	  the	  first	  Asian	  country	  to	  reach	  the	  five	  percent	  threshold	  of	  industrial	  growth	  rates,	  it	  initially	  lagged	  behind	  countries	  in	  the	  European	  periphery	  and	  Latin	  America.	  7	  Abramovitz	  (1986,	  p.	  395)	  states	  that	  "[p]roductivity	  levels...were	  erratic	  indicators	  of	  gaps	  between	  existing	  and	  best-­‐practice	  technology."	  8	  Tang	  (2011)	  identifies	  the	  large,	  family-­‐owned	  zaibatsu	  conglomerates	  as	  instrumental	  in	  introducing	  many	  new	  technologies	  to	  the	  economy,	  which	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  firms'	  increased	  risk	  capacity	  and	  lower	  capital	  costs	  from	  internal	  financing.	  Braguinsky	  et	  al	  (2015)	  find	  that	  better	  managed	  cotton	  spinning	  firms	  increased	  profitability	  in	  newly	  acquired	  facilities	  through	  lower	  inventories	  and	  increased	  capacity	  utilization.	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crucial	  was	  the	  diffusion	  of	  best	  practices,	  with	  sectors	  like	  cotton	  spinning	  directly	  benefitting	  from	  the	  use	  of	  American	  ring	  spindles	  (replacing	  British	  mule	  spindles),	  which	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  country's	  abundant	  labour	  and	  consumer	  demand	  for	  lower	  quality	  and	  cheaper	  textiles	  (Saxonhouse	  1974).	  	  While	  there	  is	  substantial	  variation	  across	  countries	  in	  how	  quickly	  they	  adopt	  technologies,	  successful	  latecomers	  to	  industrialization	  like	  the	  East	  Asian	  tiger	  economies	  appear	  to	  have	  caught	  up	  with	  technological	  leaders	  by	  reducing	  the	  adoption	  lag	  in	  a	  subset	  of	  technologies	  (Comin	  and	  Hobijn	  2010).	  However,	  it	  is	  uncertain	  whether	  the	  impact	  of	  innovations	  from	  individual	  sectors	  generalizes	  to	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole	  or	  how	  different	  technologies	  and	  their	  economic	  significance	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  each	  other.9	  Innovation	  is	  typically	  identified	  at	  a	  micro-­‐level	  (e.g.,	  patents,	  products)	  or	  backed	  out	  as	  a	  residual	  in	  macroeconomic	  production	  functions	  (Mokyr	  1990;	  Fukao	  et	  al	  2015).10	  At	  the	  industry	  level,	  there	  is	  ambiguity	  as	  to	  what	  constitutes	  technological	  progress	  (as	  opposed	  to	  capital	  utilization	  and	  labour	  productivity),	  and	  this	  is	  further	  complicated	  by	  data	  availability	  and	  comparative	  consistency	  between	  sectors.	  In	  more	  practical	  terms	  for	  analysis,	  it	  may	  be	  infeasible	  both	  to	  make	  an	  exhaustive	  inventory	  of	  all	  micro-­‐inventions	  to	  estimate	  a	  national	  value	  or	  isolate	  the	  value	  of	  general	  purpose	  technologies	  that	  are	  used	  in	  multiple	  sectors	  or	  goods.	  This	  paper	  addresses	  these	  measurement	  issues	  by	  assuming	  that	  industry	  classification	  itself	  is	  a	  useful	  gauge	  of	  technology	  differences,	  and	  the	  emergence	  and	  growth	  of	  different	  industries	  over	  time	  representing	  technological	  adoption	  and	  diffusion.	  This	  assumption	  has	  historical	  precedent	  both	  in	  economic	  analysis	  and	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  industrial	  classification	  systems,	  with	  Abramovitz	  (1986,	  p.	  386)	  claiming	  that	  technology	  is	  embodied	  in	  the	  capital	  stock	  and	  the	  "technological	  age	  of	  the	  stock	  is,	  so	  to	  speak,	  the	  same	  as	  its	  chronological	  age."	  The	  United	  States	  Standard	  Industrial	  Classification	  (SIC)	  system	  itself	  is	  oriented	  around	  production	  techniques,	  which	  served	  the	  country's	  statistical	  agencies	  well	  until	  the	  nature	  of	  production	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Gerschenkron	  (1962,	  pp.	  42-­‐43)	  suggests	  per	  capita	  output	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  backwardness	  as	  unsatisfactory	  given	  differences	  in	  the	  range	  of	  output	  and	  availability	  of	  price	  data.	  A	  notable	  example	  of	  consistent	  measurement	  and	  economic	  impact	  in	  technology	  adoption	  is	  Saxonhouse	  and	  Wright	  (2010),	  which	  tracks	  the	  diffusion	  of	  cotton	  spinning	  technology	  over	  fifty	  years	  across	  multiple	  countries.	  10	  Mokyr's	  distinguishes	  micro-­‐innovations	  as	  being	  incremental	  improvements	  in	  productivity	  while	  macro-­‐innovations	  relate	  to	  paradigm	  shifts.	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shifted	  in	  the	  late	  twentieth	  century	  (United	  States	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Analysis	  1994).	  Applied	  to	  the	  industrialization	  of	  Japan	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  with	  the	  contemporaneous	  experience	  of	  the	  United	  States	  used	  as	  a	  reference,	  this	  framework	  allows	  one	  to	  test	  hypotheses	  regarding	  technological	  convergence.	  Some	  include	  whether	  new	  Japanese	  industries	  appeared	  relatively	  sooner	  compared	  to	  those	  in	  the	  U.S.;	  whether	  their	  emergence	  was	  affected	  by	  the	  scale	  of	  enterprises	  within	  those	  sectors	  and	  industry-­‐level	  capital	  intensity;	  whether	  the	  existence	  of	  similar	  industries	  encouraged	  the	  introduction	  of	  new,	  but	  related	  technologies;	  and	  if	  there	  was	  a	  difference	  between	  appearance	  of	  an	  industry	  (i.e.,	  adoption)	  and	  its	  growth	  to	  economic	  significance	  (i.e.,	  diffusion).	  	  	   DATA	  SOURCES	  The	  data	  used	  in	  the	  analysis	  come	  from	  official	  records	  collected	  by	  the	  statistical	  agencies	  in	  the	  two	  countries,	  either	  in	  statistical	  yearbooks	  (Japan)	  or	  decennial	  economic	  censuses	  (United	  States).	  Specifically,	  data	  in	  the	  Statistical	  
Yearbook	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Empire	  were	  compiled	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister's	  Cabinet	  Statistics	  Bureau	  from	  different	  government	  agencies'	  records	  and	  occasionally	  from	  individual	  firms	  into	  annual	  reports	  between	  1883	  and	  1936	  (Japan	  Statistical	  Association	  1962).	  The	  information	  included	  in	  these	  yearbooks	  covers	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  Japanese	  economy	  and	  population	  and	  often	  at	  the	  prefecture	  and	  industry	  level,	  although	  not	  necessarily	  both.	  Industry	  statistics	  were	  progressively	  standardized	  during	  the	  1880s	  and	  1890s	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  detail	  included	  and	  how	  sectors	  were	  classified,	  such	  as	  the	  reporting	  of	  manufacturing	  separate	  from	  sales	  starting	  in	  year	  1885.	  Industry	  names	  also	  changed	  slightly	  to	  accommodate	  expansion	  or	  contraction	  of	  activities.	  For	  the	  Meiji	  Period,	  consistent	  series	  at	  the	  industry	  level	  are	  available	  from	  the	  mid	  1880s	  for	  the	  number	  of	  establishments	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  paid-­‐in	  capital,	  whereas	  data	  on	  employment,	  raw	  materials,	  and	  output	  are	  not	  comprehensive	  across	  sectors	  until	  the	  early	  1900s.	  	  In	  contrast,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  the	  relative	  enormity	  of	  the	  task	  and	  infrequency	  of	  data	  collection,	  American	  statistics	  tended	  to	  be	  more	  complete.	  Starting	  with	  the	  1810	  census,	  economic	  data	  collection	  took	  place	  along	  with	  population	  enumerations	  every	  decade	  until	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  when	  a	  permanent	  census	  office	  was	  established	  in	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1902	  (Boehme	  1987;	  United	  States	  Bureau	  of	  the	  Census,	  various	  years).11	  The	  Permanent	  Census	  Act	  had	  provisions	  for	  economic	  statistics	  to	  be	  collected	  on	  a	  five-­‐year	  basis	  starting	  in	  1905.12	  While	  accuracy	  and	  information	  increased	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  such	  as	  including	  workers,	  raw	  materials,	  and	  equipment	  (1820)	  and	  adding	  sections	  on	  fishing,	  mining,	  and	  trade	  (1840),	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  century	  that	  consistent	  and	  detailed	  instructions	  were	  used	  in	  the	  enumerations	  (1850)	  and	  that	  trained	  specialists	  instead	  of	  U.S.	  marshals	  collected	  the	  data	  (1880).	  These	  changes	  in	  coverage	  for	  both	  countries	  mean	  that	  reliable	  industrial	  data	  can	  be	  analysed	  only	  after	  1885	  for	  Japan	  and	  1850	  for	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  these	  are	  limited	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  series	  available	  for	  all	  manufacturing	  sectors,	  namely	  the	  number	  of	  establishments	  and	  capital	  value.13	  Fortunately,	  the	  decades	  following	  these	  two	  starting	  points	  sufficiently	  span	  major	  periods	  of	  industrial	  development	  in	  both	  countries,	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  1.14	  For	  Japan,	  the	  initial	  wave	  of	  sustained	  industrial	  activity	  occurred	  after	  the	  fiscal	  retrenchment	  of	  the	  early	  1880s,	  when	  the	  government	  privatized	  many	  of	  its	  enterprises	  and	  its	  financial	  restructuring	  stabilized	  the	  currency	  and	  reduced	  inflation	  (Allen	  1946,	  pp.	  46-­‐47).	  In	  the	  quarter	  century	  to	  1910,	  the	  number	  of	  firms	  increased	  seven-­‐fold	  while	  their	  nominal	  level	  of	  paid-­‐in	  capital	  rose	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  twenty	  (Japan	  Statistical	  Association	  1962).15	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  undergoing	  significant	  structural	  change	  following	  its	  Civil	  War	  in	  1861-­‐65.	  The	  economy	  began	  to	  actively	  employ	  mass	  production	  techniques	  and	  to	  expand	  its	  manufacturing	  sector,	  which	  exceeded	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	  1810	  census	  was	  the	  third	  to	  take	  place,	  and	  included	  for	  the	  first	  time	  questions	  on	  goods	  and	  manufactures.	  Atack	  and	  Bateman	  (1999)	  also	  describe	  changes	  in	  data	  collection	  and	  quality	  over	  time.	  	  Japanese	  statistical	  collection	  increased	  in	  sophistication	  as	  well,	  which	  may	  be	  due	  to	  greater	  institutional	  capacity	  acquired	  over	  time.	  12	  The	  frequency	  of	  economic	  censuses	  also	  changed	  to	  biennial,	  then	  four-­‐yearly	  enumerations	  before	  returning	  to	  a	  quinquennial	  basis;	  ibid.	  	  13	  Even	  these	  series	  are	  not	  exact	  mappings,	  with	  Japan	  reporting	  nominal	  paid-­‐in	  capital	  value	  for	  industries	  while	  the	  United	  States	  giving	  the	  value	  of	  industries'	  fixed	  capital	  assets.	  14	  Table	  1	  omits	  the	  column	  containing	  statistics	  for	  the	  1905	  economic	  census,	  which	  are	  included	  in	  the	  regression	  analysis.	  15	  Official	  firm	  numbers	  may	  understate	  entrepreneurial	  activity	  such	  as	  that	  performed	  informally	  or	  sole	  proprietorships,	  with	  more	  accurate	  figures	  reported	  starting	  in	  the	  mid	  1880s	  (Tang	  2011).	  Financial	  figures	  are	  given	  in	  current	  U.S.	  dollars	  at	  market	  exchange	  rates	  for	  Japan,	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  underestimates	  compared	  to	  those	  calculated	  using	  purchasing	  price	  parity	  (PPP).	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agriculture	  in	  value	  in	  the	  1880s	  and	  was	  the	  international	  leader	  by	  1900	  (Atack	  and	  Passell	  1994,	  p.	  457;	  Boehme	  1987).	  The	  periods	  of	  analysis	  for	  both	  countries	  end	  in	  1910,	  which	  coincides	  with	  the	  last	  years	  of	  the	  Meiji	  Period	  and	  Japan's	  first	  wave	  of	  industrialization.	  It	  also	  allows	  use	  of	  the	  last	  quinquennial	  American	  economic	  census	  prior	  to	  World	  War	  I,	  which	  further	  changed	  the	  composition	  and	  development	  of	  the	  two	  economies.	  Comparing	  Japan's	  industrial	  development	  with	  that	  of	  the	  United	  States	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  neither	  country	  had	  a	  standardized	  industry	  classification	  (SIC)	  system	  until	  well	  into	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  To	  ensure	  consistent	  comparison	  over	  time	  and	  between	  countries,	  industries	  from	  the	  Japanese	  yearbooks	  and	  American	  censuses	  are	  coded	  retroactively	  using	  the	  1987	  United	  States	  SIC	  system	  at	  the	  three-­‐digit	  level	  (United	  States	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget	  1987).16	  This	  coding	  reduces	  the	  number	  of	  industries	  listed	  in	  the	  historical	  records	  on	  average	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  two.	  For	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  number	  of	  SIC3	  industries	  was	  fairly	  unchanged	  throughout	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  around	  one	  hundred,	  while	  in	  Japan	  the	  number	  steadily	  increased,	  trebling	  in	  twenty-­‐five	  years.	  By	  1910,	  Japan	  had	  nearly	  two-­‐thirds	  the	  number	  of	  SIC3	  industries	  as	  the	  U.S.,	  compared	  to	  less	  than	  one-­‐fifth	  in	  1885.	  This	  absolute	  growth	  in	  Japanese	  SIC3	  industries	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  number	  of	  completely	  new	  sectors,	  with	  twenty	  appearing	  within	  five	  years	  after	  1885	  and	  another	  nineteen	  in	  the	  following	  ten	  years.	  A	  similar	  increase	  of	  industrial	  diversification	  occurred	  in	  the	  United	  States	  two	  decades	  earlier,	  when	  nineteen	  new	  industries	  appeared	  between	  the	  1850	  and	  1860	  censuses,	  and	  another	  thirteen	  in	  the	  next	  two	  decades.17	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  official	  records	  used	  to	  construct	  these	  industrial	  series,	  a	  few	  other	  sources	  of	  statistics	  are	  used.	  For	  Japan,	  these	  include	  national	  income	  and	  population	  figures	  from	  the	  Historical	  Statistics	  of	  Japan	  collection	  and	  industry	  output	  values	  from	  the	  Estimates	  of	  Long-­‐Term	  Economic	  Statistics;	  for	  the	  United	  States,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Atack	  and	  Bateman	  (1999)	  also	  use	  three-­‐digit	  1987	  SIC	  codes	  in	  their	  analysis	  of	  U.S.	  Census	  of	  Manufacturing	  extracts	  for	  the	  1850,	  1860,	  1870,	  and	  1880	  enumerations.	  17	  The	  data	  appendix	  lists	  new	  industries	  in	  both	  countries	  by	  three-­‐digit	  SIC	  and	  time	  of	  appearance.	  Note	  that	  the	  timing	  of	  industry	  appearance	  does	  not	  preclude	  earlier	  existence	  in	  the	  economy	  (e.g.,	  textile	  dyeing	  and	  finishing),	  but	  reflects	  the	  shift	  toward	  modern	  production	  methods;	  scale	  sufficient	  to	  merit	  itemized	  classification;	  and	  government	  interest	  in	  recording	  the	  activity;	  see	  the	  concluding	  section	  and	  Tang	  (2011)	  for	  a	  discussion.	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historical	  estimates	  of	  national	  income	  and	  population	  come	  from	  MeasuringWorth	  (Japan	  Statistical	  Association	  2007;	  Shinohara	  1972;	  Williamson	  2015).	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  two	  countries	  differ	  in	  the	  methodology	  used	  to	  calculate	  national	  income,	  with	  the	  United	  States	  measuring	  it	  as	  gross	  domestic	  product	  while	  for	  Japan	  it	  was	  typically	  gross	  national	  expenditure.18	  	  Furthermore,	  Japanese	  industry	  output	  values	  are	  aggregated	  at	  a	  much	  higher	  level	  (two-­‐digit	  SIC)	  than	  those	  for	  the	  U.S.	  While	  this	  does	  not	  pose	  a	  technical	  problem	  for	  the	  analytical	  model	  since	  the	  output	  values	  series	  are	  used	  to	  construct	  average	  capital	  intensity	  ratios	  (capital	  value	  to	  output	  value),	  it	  does	  mean	  that	  figures	  for	  Japan	  will	  be	  less	  precise	  than	  the	  equivalent	  American	  ratios.	  All	  income	  and	  output	  values	  are	  in	  current	  U.S.	  dollars,	  with	  the	  Japanese	  figures	  converted	  from	  yen	  using	  prevailing	  market	  exchange	  rates	  averaged	  over	  the	  given	  year.	   	  EMPIRICAL	  METHODOLOGY	  	   To	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  Japan	  adopted	  technologies	  faster	  than	  advanced	  economies	  like	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  thus	  enabling	  it	  to	  converge	  toward	  industrial	  leaders,	  this	  paper	  uses	  a	  duration	  analysis	  model	  to	  compare	  the	  relative	  timing	  of	  industry	  development	  in	  the	  two	  countries.	  Duration	  analysis	  models,	  also	  known	  as	  survival	  analysis	  models,	  measure	  the	  hazard	  rate	  (risk)	  of	  an	  event	  occurrence,	  like	  death	  or	  unemployment	  (Cleves	  et	  al	  2008).19	  In	  terms	  of	  this	  paper,	  the	  analysis	  estimates	  the	  expected	  time	  to	  when	  a	  new	  industry	  will	  appear	  in	  an	  economy	  based	  on	  a	  parametric	  model	  conditional	  on	  covariates	  that	  may	  influence	  the	  occurrence	  like	  per	  capita	  income.	  One	  of	  the	  advantages	  to	  using	  duration	  analysis	  instead	  of	  other	  regression	  models	  is	  that	  censored	  subjects	  (e.g.,	  industries	  that	  do	  not	  pass	  the	  capital	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Similarly,	  the	  Estimates	  of	  Long-­‐Term	  Economic	  Statistics	  volume	  edited	  by	  Ohkawa	  et	  al	  (1974)	  report	  gross	  national	  expenditure.	  GDP	  measures	  are	  available	  for	  Japan,	  but	  post-­‐date	  the	  earliest	  available	  industrial	  series	  (Japan	  Statistical	  Association	  2007).	  There	  are	  efforts	  to	  update	  the	  historical	  estimates	  of	  Japanese	  output,	  but	  currently	  are	  unavailable	  at	  an	  annual	  or	  quinquennial	  basis;	  for	  example,	  Fukao	  et	  al	  (2015)	  estimate	  production	  levels	  using	  prefectural	  data	  for	  the	  pre-­‐World	  War	  One	  years	  of	  1874,	  1890,	  and	  1909.	  	  19	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  duration	  model	  types	  (e.g.,	  parametric,	  semiparametric)	  and	  probability	  distributions	  (e.g.,	  exponential,	  Weibull),	  the	  selection	  of	  which	  depends	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  interest	  (e.g.,	  duration	  time,	  relative	  hazard	  ratios)	  and	  observed	  or	  expected	  behavior	  over	  time,	  respectively.	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threshold)	  remain	  in	  the	  analysis	  and	  thus	  improve	  the	  precision	  of	  the	  estimated	  coefficients.	  Before	  continuing,	  it	  may	  be	  reasonable	  to	  consider	  whether	  duration	  analysis	  is	  appropriate	  to	  model	  industry	  emergence	  in	  both	  countries	  for	  the	  periods	  in	  question.	  Figure	  1	  plots	  the	  appearance	  of	  new	  industries	  (vertical	  axis)	  over	  time	  as	  given	  in	  the	  data,	  and	  shows	  comparable	  trends	  for	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Japan,	  albeit	  separated	  by	  nearly	  three	  decades.	  The	  Japanese	  trend	  is	  also	  more	  compressed	  in	  timing,	  which	  corresponds	  with	  its	  faster	  industrial	  growth	  rates	  relative	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  both	  countries,	  new	  industries	  appear	  mostly	  in	  the	  first	  third	  of	  their	  respective	  periods	  of	  analysis,	  with	  a	  noticeable	  decline	  in	  technology	  adoption	  thereafter.	  [Figure	  1]	  Figure	  2	  plots	  the	  two	  countries'	  curves	  as	  estimated	  probabilities	  of	  new	  industry	  appearance	  in	  a	  given	  year	  using	  the	  Kaplan-­‐Meier	  survival	  function.	  The	  interpretation	  is	  that	  the	  likelihood	  (vertical	  axis)	  of	  new	  industry	  appearance	  is	  high	  early	  in	  the	  period	  of	  analysis	  for	  each	  country,	  with	  subsequent	  appearances	  less	  likely	  to	  occur	  over	  time.	  Here	  the	  similarity	  between	  the	  two	  countries'	  curves	  is	  even	  more	  striking,	  with	  all	  estimated	  probabilities	  statistically	  significant	  at	  least	  to	  the	  ten	  per	  cent	  level.	  Log-­‐rank	  tests	  of	  equality	  between	  the	  two	  countries'	  survival	  functions	  also	  fail	  to	  be	  rejected	  at	  that	  level.	   [Figure	  2]	  Given	  the	  differences	  in	  capital	  investment	  and	  economic	  development	  over	  time	  and	  between	  countries,	  it	  may	  be	  more	  informative	  to	  include	  additional	  variables	  that	  may	  influence	  the	  timing	  of	  industry	  appearance.	  Assuming	  a	  conditional	  probability	  of	  industry	  appearance	  that	  is	  constant	  over	  time	  (i.e.,	  a	  Poisson	  or	  exponential	  distribution),	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  observed	  pattern	  of	  appearance	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1,	  the	  basic	  functional	  form	  of	  the	  model	  is:	  	   	   𝑙𝑜𝑔  (𝑡) = 𝑋!𝛽! + 𝑋!"𝛽! + 𝑧,	  where	  
	   t	  =	  time	  to	  industry	  appearance	  
	   Xi	  =	  country-­‐level	  variables	  indexed	  by	  i	  	  	   	   (e.g.,	  per	  capita	  income,	  Japan	  indicator	  variable)	  
	   Xij	  =	  control	  variables	  indexed	  by	  country	  i	  and	  industry	  j	  	  
	   	   (e.g.,	  average	  firm	  capital	  level,	  interaction	  variables)	  
	   z	  =	  error	  term	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  New	  industries	  are	  identified	  using	  the	  earliest	  available	  data:	  for	  Japan,	  these	  include	  industries	  starting	  in	  1885,	  and	  for	  the	  United	  States,	  those	  in	  1850.	  Using	  these	  sets	  of	  sectors	  as	  benchmarks	  for	  each	  country,	  any	  sectors	  appearing	  in	  successive	  years	  until	  1910	  are	  considered	  new,	  with	  the	  corresponding	  duration	  in	  between	  measured	  as	  an	  outcome	  variable	  t.	  The	  group	  of	  industries	  from	  the	  reference	  years,	  which	  are	  considered	  left-­‐truncated,	  are	  omitted	  from	  the	  analysis.20	  	  The	  model	  tests	  whether	  time-­‐to-­‐appearance	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  following	  economy	  and	  industry	  level	  differences:	  a)	  income	  per	  capita,	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  relative	  backwardness;	  b)	  a	  Japan	  indicator	  variable,	  to	  identify	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  countries;	  c)	  the	  average	  level	  of	  firm	  capital	  in	  each	  country,	  calculated	  by	  dividing	  an	  industry's	  capital	  value	  by	  its	  number	  of	  enterprises,	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  firm	  scale;	  d)	  the	  share	  of	  capital	  invested	  in	  similar	  sectors	  (i.e.,	  three-­‐digit	  SIC	  industries	  within	  the	  same	  two-­‐digit	  industry	  group)	  out	  of	  total	  capital	  invested	  across	  manufacturing	  sectors	  in	  country	  i,	  to	  account	  for	  relative	  innovativeness;	  e)	  industry	  capital	  intensity	  in	  country	  i,	  which	  is	  the	  value	  of	  capital	  divided	  by	  the	  value	  of	  output;	  and	  f)	  interactions	  between	  the	  Japan	  indicator	  and	  industry	  level	  variables.21	  Since	  the	  impact	  of	  industrialization	  is	  felt	  more	  in	  its	  sustained	  growth	  over	  time	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  possibly	  short-­‐lived	  market	  appearance,	  separate	  regressions	  are	  run	  using	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable	  the	  duration	  until	  an	  industry	  attains	  economic	  significance,	  defined	  as	  having	  at	  least	  half	  a	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  country's	  total	  manufacturing	  capital.22	  This	  dependent	  variable	  allows	  inclusion	  of	  industries	  that	  appear	  in	  the	  data	  series,	  but	  do	  not	  receive	  sufficient	  capital	  investment,	  thus	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Left-­‐truncation	  differs	  from	  left-­‐censorship	  in	  that	  the	  latter	  includes	  industries	  that	  have	  not	  yet	  experienced	  a	  threshold	  event,	  but	  their	  existence	  precedes	  their	  appearance	  in	  the	  data.	  This	  difference	  is	  meaningful	  only	  in	  the	  duration	  analysis	  of	  economic	  significance	  as	  new	  industries	  appearing	  in	  the	  data	  have	  no	  prior	  existence.	  21	  A	  similar	  method	  of	  assessing	  industry	  innovativeness	  is	  used	  in	  Tang	  (2011).	  22	  Given	  approximately	  two	  hundred	  possible	  three-­‐digit	  SIC	  industries,	  the	  half	  per	  cent	  threshold	  would	  approximate	  a	  uniform	  distribution	  of	  invested	  capital	  for	  each	  industry	  (i.e.,	  each	  industry	  of	  equal	  importance).	  Since	  industries	  varied	  considerably	  in	  age	  and	  capital	  investment,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  this	  threshold	  is	  a	  reasonable	  metric	  to	  measure	  absolute	  growth	  and	  technological	  diffusion.	  Separate	  robustness	  checks	  using	  the	  higher	  threshold	  of	  one	  percent	  total	  manufacturing	  capital	  stock	  are	  also	  performed	  and	  presented	  in	  the	  following	  section.	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improving	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  coefficients	  as	  well	  as	  increasing	  the	  overlap	  of	  industries	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  	  One	  issue	  with	  matching	  the	  industrial	  data	  between	  Japan	  and	  the	  United	  States	  is	  that	  those	  for	  the	  latter	  were	  collected	  every	  ten	  years	  before	  1900,	  whereas	  the	  Japanese	  data	  are	  annual.	  Thus,	  dating	  the	  appearance	  of	  new	  industries	  and	  when	  industries	  attain	  economic	  significance	  in	  America	  is	  less	  precise	  (also	  known	  as	  interval	  censorship).	  Consequently,	  this	  may	  bias	  the	  results	  in	  favour	  of	  finding	  technological	  convergence	  for	  Japan	  since	  the	  dependent	  variables	  measure	  the	  duration	  until	  appearance	  or	  diffusion.	  To	  mitigate	  this	  bias,	  both	  countries'	  data	  are	  coded	  as	  five-­‐year	  intervals	  (which	  also	  coincide	  with	  the	  post-­‐1900	  U.S.	  enumerations),	  and	  imputing	  event	  occurrence	  dates	  in	  a	  shorter	  span	  of	  time	  for	  U.S.	  sectors.	  For	  example,	  in	  measuring	  the	  time	  for	  an	  American	  industry	  to	  pass	  the	  half	  per	  cent	  threshold	  of	  total	  capital	  stock,	  if	  the	  sector	  has	  a	  capital	  share	  of	  0.1	  per	  cent	  in	  1860	  and	  2	  per	  cent	  in	  1870,	  instead	  of	  dating	  the	  occurrence	  as	  passing	  the	  threshold	  in	  1870,	  it	  is	  coded	  as	  1865	  based	  on	  the	  arithmetic	  average	  between	  the	  two	  enumerations.	  Attendant	  covariates	  like	  related	  industry	  capital	  share	  and	  capital	  intensity	  are	  similarly	  imputed.	  To	  match	  the	  level	  of	  imprecision	  in	  the	  American	  data,	  Japan	  industries	  are	  recoded	  also	  in	  five-­‐year	  periods,	  which	  means	  they	  may	  appear	  up	  to	  four	  years	  later	  (e.g.,	  an	  industry	  appearing	  in	  1891	  coded	  as	  1895)	  and	  would	  use	  the	  later	  date's	  industry-­‐	  and	  economy-­‐level	  values	  in	  the	  covariates.	  	   REGRESSION	  RESULTS	  Regression	  results	  from	  the	  parametric	  duration	  model	  indicate	  that	  while	  lower	  per	  capita	  income	  is	  associated	  with	  faster	  technology	  adoption,	  new	  industries	  did	  not	  appear	  relatively	  earlier	  in	  Japan	  compared	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  As	  shown	  in	  Table	  2,	  the	  coefficient	  on	  per	  capita	  income	  (row	  1)	  is	  positive,	  which	  indicates	  increased	  duration	  until	  industry	  appearance,	  and	  usually	  statistically	  significant.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  developing	  countries	  converging	  toward	  technological	  leaders,	  with	  new	  manufacturing	  sectors	  appearing	  earlier	  presumably	  due	  to	  a	  technological	  backlog	  from	  which	  to	  establish	  industries.	  However,	  the	  Japan	  indicator	  variable	  (row	  2)	  is	  also	  positive	  and	  despite	  most	  of	  its	  interactions	  with	  industry	  covariates	  being	  negative	  (all	  are	  statistically	  significant),	  the	  net	  effect	  (row	  11)	  remains	  positive	  and	  weakly	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significant.23	  This	  net	  effect	  indicates	  that	  as	  a	  whole	  new	  Japanese	  manufacturing	  sectors	  appear	  in	  the	  economy	  no	  sooner	  than	  those	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  later.	  [Table	  2]	  Among	  the	  covariates,	  both	  average	  firm	  capital	  level	  (row	  3)	  and	  the	  capital	  share	  of	  related	  sectors	  (row	  4)	  are	  negatively	  associated	  with	  expected	  duration.	  This	  suggests	  that	  new	  industries	  with	  higher	  invested	  capital	  per	  firm	  emerge	  more	  quickly,	  and	  this	  is	  especially	  true	  for	  Japan	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  positively	  signed	  and	  larger	  coefficient	  on	  the	  interaction	  variable	  (row	  6).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  while	  more	  capital	  invested	  in	  related	  sectors	  may	  ease	  the	  appearance	  of	  new	  industries	  in	  general,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  greater	  availability	  of	  transferable	  technology	  and	  resources,	  the	  effect	  is	  reversed	  in	  Japan	  (row	  7).	  This	  contrasts	  with	  industry	  capital	  intensity,	  which	  has	  a	  positive	  sign	  on	  the	  overall	  effect,	  but	  a	  negative	  one	  when	  interacted	  with	  the	  Japan	  fixed	  effect.	  One	  explanation	  for	  the	  latter	  two	  interactions	  is	  that	  capital	  scarcity	  led	  to	  the	  concentration	  of	  resources	  in	  fewer,	  but	  more	  capital	  intensive	  sectors.	  This	  interpretation	  can	  further	  be	  qualified	  by	  the	  observation	  that	  higher	  capital	  intensity	  is	  derivative	  of	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  capital	  equipment	  (i.e.,	  imported)	  relative	  to	  output	  value	  in	  Japan.	  Interestingly,	  the	  above	  findings	  do	  not	  carry	  through	  to	  those	  using	  the	  half	  per	  cent	  capital	  stock	  threshold	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  shown	  in	  Table	  3.	  Per	  capita	  income	  (row	  1)	  now	  is	  negatively	  signed,	  indicating	  faster	  growth	  of	  manufacturing	  in	  wealthier	  countries.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  indicator	  variable	  for	  Japan	  (row	  2)	  is	  also	  negatively	  signed	  and	  combined	  with	  its	  interactions	  with	  other	  covariates,	  the	  net	  effect	  (row	  11)	  is	  negative	  and	  statistically	  significant.	  This	  suggests	  that	  Japanese	  sectors	  grew	  to	  economic	  significance,	  with	  diffusion	  of	  embodied	  technology,	  relatively	  faster	  than	  those	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  even	  with	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  time	  trend	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  actual	  timing.	   [Table	  3]	  Among	  the	  covariates,	  average	  firm	  capital	  (row	  3)	  changes	  signs	  and	  loses	  significance	  compared	  to	  the	  previous	  table	  and	  related	  sector	  capital	  share	  (row	  4)	  has	  a	  negative	  and	  insignificant	  coefficient.	  Only	  industry	  capital	  intensity	  (row	  5)	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  The	  net	  effect	  is	  calculated	  using	  a	  Wald	  test	  of	  the	  linear	  combination	  of	  all	  control	  variables	  excluding	  income	  per	  capita	  and	  year	  trend,	  evaluated	  at	  the	  population	  average	  for	  the	  Japan	  subset	  of	  new	  industries.	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statistically	  significant	  but	  now	  with	  a	  negative	  sign,	  while	  all	  the	  interactions	  with	  the	  Japan	  indicator	  variable	  are	  weakly	  or	  not	  significant.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  unlike	  with	  the	  appearance	  of	  new	  industries,	  their	  growth	  is	  less	  affected	  by	  firm	  or	  industry	  group	  scale,	  and	  that	  aside	  from	  the	  timing	  itself,	  there	  were	  no	  substantive	  differences	  between	  countries	  as	  captured	  by	  these	  industry	  characteristics.	  To	  check	  the	  robustness	  of	  these	  results,	  one	  can	  change	  the	  period	  of	  analysis	  as	  well	  as	  the	  capital	  stock	  threshold.	  These	  results	  are	  shown	  in	  Tables	  4	  and	  5,	  respectively.	  In	  Table	  4,	  the	  period	  of	  analysis	  for	  the	  United	  States	  is	  shortened	  by	  ten	  years,	  either	  by	  postponing	  the	  starting	  year	  to	  1860	  or	  by	  advancing	  the	  ending	  year	  to	  1900;	  the	  analysis	  period	  for	  Japan	  remains	  unchanged.	  For	  industry	  new	  appearance,	  changing	  the	  benchmark	  year	  to	  1860	  (column	  A)	  reduces	  the	  number	  of	  new	  industries	  by	  nineteen	  (row	  12),	  but	  does	  not	  affect	  most	  of	  the	  main	  results	  from	  the	  full	  period	  of	  analysis	  in	  Table	  2	  (column	  E).	  That	  is,	  both	  average	  firm	  capital	  (row	  6)	  and	  industry	  capital	  intensity	  (row	  8)	  are	  associated	  with	  faster	  industry	  appearance	  in	  Japan,	  but	  the	  net	  effect	  (row	  11)	  remains	  positive	  and	  insignificant.	  The	  results	  from	  moving	  the	  end	  year	  to	  1900	  (column	  B)	  replicate	  those	  from	  the	  earlier	  table	  as	  no	  new	  industries	  appeared	  in	  either	  the	  1905	  or	  1910	  economic	  censuses.	  [Table	  4]	  The	  different	  start	  and	  end	  years	  also	  do	  not	  affect	  the	  main	  results	  for	  industries	  reaching	  the	  half	  per	  cent	  capital	  stock	  threshold,	  shown	  in	  columns	  C	  and	  D.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  estimates	  are	  similar	  in	  magnitude	  and	  match	  in	  sign	  and	  statistical	  significance,	  with	  the	  net	  effects	  indicating	  faster	  growth	  of	  new	  industries	  in	  Japan,	  which	  is	  associated	  with	  overall	  capital	  intensity	  and	  the	  size	  of	  Japanese	  firms.	  The	  net	  effect	  is	  particularly	  pronounced	  with	  an	  earlier	  American	  end	  date,	  which	  may	  owe	  to	  the	  longer	  duration	  until	  reaching	  the	  capital	  threshold	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  thus	  censors	  ten	  industries	  from	  the	  analysis.	  [Table	  5]	  The	  second	  robustness	  check	  uses	  a	  one	  per	  cent	  total	  capital	  stock	  threshold	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  technological	  diffusion.	  These	  results,	  shown	  in	  Table	  5,	  indicate	  that	  while	  average	  firm	  capitalization	  in	  Japan	  still	  reduces	  the	  time	  to	  passing	  the	  threshold,	  the	  net	  effect	  is	  no	  longer	  negatively	  signed.	  Furthermore,	  including	  a	  time	  trend	  variable	  (column	  E)	  increases	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  positive	  net	  effect	  and	  is	  weakly	  significant,	  suggesting	  a	  longer	  time	  to	  economic	  significance	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  This	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finding	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  relatively	  short	  length	  of	  the	  Japanese	  industrial	  data	  series;	  when	  compared	  to	  a	  shorter	  analysis	  period	  for	  the	  United	  States	  ending	  in	  1900,	  the	  net	  effect	  becomes	  insignificant	  and	  negatively	  signed.	  	   CONCLUSION	  Given	  the	  enormous	  differences	  in	  economic	  and	  industrial	  development	  between	  Japan	  and	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  it	  may	  seem	  obvious	  that	  some	  convergence	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  would	  occur	  with	  sufficient	  resources	  and	  institutions.	  That	  Japan	  did	  make	  considerable	  progress	  in	  reducing	  the	  gap	  owes	  in	  part	  to	  the	  rapidity	  of	  its	  industrialization	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  technologies	  developed	  by	  industrial	  pioneers.	  The	  results	  from	  duration	  analysis	  provide	  evidence	  that	  while	  Japanese	  industries	  were	  able	  to	  spread	  technologies	  via	  industry	  growth	  more	  quickly,	  it	  is	  qualified	  by	  the	  relatively	  slow	  adoption	  of	  new	  technologies	  themselves.	  In	  other	  words,	  technological	  adoption	  and	  diffusion	  were	  distinct	  phenomena	  in	  Japan,	  and	  even	  the	  latter	  may	  require	  longer	  periods	  of	  development	  than	  the	  two	  decades	  considered	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  How	  does	  one	  reconcile	  these	  seemingly	  opposing	  results?	  One	  issue	  may	  be	  the	  precision	  of	  the	  data,	  which	  are	  still	  fairly	  aggregated	  even	  at	  the	  three-­‐digit	  industry	  code	  level.	  This	  may	  obscure	  discrete	  advances	  in	  technologies	  within	  industry	  codes	  as	  well	  as	  the	  continued	  use	  of	  traditional	  methods	  alongside	  modern	  ones,	  as	  was	  observed	  in	  Japan	  throughout	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century.24	  The	  periods	  chosen	  for	  analysis,	  based	  on	  data	  availability,	  may	  also	  not	  be	  directly	  comparable	  since	  the	  United	  States	  was	  already	  fairly	  industrialized	  as	  measured	  in	  absolute	  production	  by	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Thus,	  the	  technologies	  adopted	  in	  its	  post-­‐bellum	  decades	  could	  be	  affected	  differently	  by	  the	  included	  covariates	  than	  those	  adopted	  in	  Japan,	  although	  the	  standard	  errors	  were	  adjusted	  to	  accommodate	  heterogeneity	  in	  sector	  and	  country.	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  findings	  corroborate	  observations	  made	  by	  Gerschenkron	  (1964,	  p.	  44)	  that	  backward	  countries	  will	  have	  larger	  firms	  and	  more	  coordination	  among	  them.	  In	  all	  specifications,	  higher	  average	  firm	  capital	  stock	  is	  associated	  with	  earlier	  entry	  and	  growth	  of	  Japanese	  industries	  compared	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Ohkawa	  and	  Rosovsky	  (1973,	  p.	  17)	  observe	  that	  half	  of	  all	  capital	  goods	  were	  still	  produced	  using	  traditional	  methods	  in	  the	  Meiji	  Period.	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many	  cases	  the	  presence	  of	  related	  sectors	  (which	  may	  serve	  as	  competition	  to	  new	  entrants	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  organic	  technological	  growth	  opportunities)	  appears	  to	  delay	  these	  outcomes.25	  	  At	  a	  broader	  level,	  one	  can	  also	  observe	  technological	  catch	  up,	  although	  possibly	  not	  industrial	  growth,	  in	  per	  capita	  income	  differences,	  with	  poorer	  countries	  adopting	  new	  technologies	  sooner	  but	  still	  requiring	  additional	  time	  for	  them	  to	  attain	  economic	  significance.	  That	  Japan	  apparently	  reverses	  this	  relationship,	  which	  is	  not	  obvious	  if	  adoption	  and	  diffusion	  are	  conflated,	  may	  help	  to	  explain	  its	  success	  in	  industrialization	  compared	  to	  its	  peer	  group	  of	  developing	  countries.	  That	  is,	  selective	  adoption	  of	  technologies,	  but	  with	  increased	  resources	  in	  those	  sectors,	  may	  have	  allowed	  Japan	  to	  increase	  in	  scale	  and	  profitability	  to	  compete	  internationally	  (e.g.,	  cotton	  textiles)	  while	  laying	  the	  foundation	  for	  further	  intensification	  during	  the	  period	  between	  the	  two	  world	  wars	  (Braguinsky	  et	  al	  2015).26	  	  While	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  analysis	  are	  suggestive,	  there	  are	  nonetheless	  a	  few	  important	  limitations	  that	  may	  be	  fruitful	  to	  explore	  in	  future	  work.	  One	  extension	  would	  be	  to	  include	  factor	  costs	  like	  raw	  materials	  and	  labour,	  the	  latter	  figuring	  prominently	  in	  the	  expansion	  of	  Japanese	  textiles.	  This	  paper	  partly	  accounts	  for	  this	  omission	  by	  using	  a	  measure	  of	  capital	  intensity	  via	  production	  value,	  but	  remains	  silent	  on	  the	  roles	  of	  internal	  labour	  mobility	  and	  differences	  in	  productivity,	  for	  which	  there	  is	  ongoing	  research	  (Fukao	  et	  al	  2015).	  Also	  absent	  here	  are	  discussions	  of	  international	  trade,	  which	  may	  have	  influenced	  the	  types	  of	  industries	  that	  developed	  during	  the	  period;	  access	  to	  foreign	  financial	  capital;	  and	  the	  role	  of	  government	  policy	  and	  expenditure,	  such	  as	  the	  establishment	  of	  enterprises	  in	  the	  early	  Meiji	  Period	  and	  public	  investments	  in	  infrastructure	  and	  strategic	  sectors.	  With	  renewed	  interest	  in	  pre-­‐war	  Japanese	  economic	  history	  and	  the	  development	  of	  new	  disaggregated	  data	  sources,	  these	  issues	  can	  be	  re-­‐examined	  using	  more	  robust	  statistical	  techniques.	  	  Regarding	  the	  current	  analysis,	  these	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  anecdotal	  accounts	  and	  aggregate	  measures	  of	  Japanese	  technological	  convergence,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Saxonhouse	  (1974)	  attributes	  the	  rapidity	  of	  technology	  transfer	  for	  cotton	  spinning	  to	  coordination	  among	  firms	  in	  that	  sector.	  26	  One	  possible	  objection	  to	  this	  interpretation	  may	  be	  the	  role	  of	  import	  protection	  via	  government	  procurement	  or	  tariff	  protection,	  but	  production	  in	  textiles	  was	  oriented	  toward	  export	  markets	  while	  Japanese	  tariffs	  averaged	  less	  than	  4	  per	  cent	  before	  1900	  and	  less	  than	  8	  percent	  until	  the	  1910s	  due	  to	  treaty	  impositions	  dating	  from	  the	  1850s	  (Perkins	  and	  Tang	  2015).	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corroborate	  research	  dating	  the	  country's	  industrial	  take-­‐off	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  before	  most	  other	  peripheral	  economies.27	  More	  generally,	  the	  methodology	  used	  here	  can	  easily	  be	  applied	  to	  other	  countries	  to	  consistently	  account	  for	  technological	  change	  within	  and	  between	  sectors	  as	  well	  as	  assess	  relative	  international	  differences	  across	  space	  and	  time.	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Appendix:	  List	  of	  New	  Industries	  	  SIC3	   Industry	  Name	   	   Entry	  Year	  	   	   	   U.S.	   Japan	  203	   Canned,	  frozen,	  and	  preserved	  fruits,	  vegetables,	  and	  food	  specialties	   	   	   1900	  206	   Sugar	  and	  confectionary	  products	   	   	   1895	  207	   Fats	  and	  oils	   	   	   1890	  211	   Cigarettes	   	   1870	   	  212	   Cigars	   	   1860	   	  213	   Chewing	  and	  smoking	  tobacco	  and	  snuff	   	   1870	   	  220	   Textile	  mill	  products	   	   	   1900	  222	   Broadwoven	  fabric	  mills,	  manmade	  fiber	  and	  silk	   	   	   1895	  223	   Broadwoven	  fabric	  mills,	  wool	  (including	  dyeing	  and	  finishing)	   	   	   1895	  225	   Knitting	  mills	   	   	   1900	  226	   Dyeing	  and	  finishing	  textiles,	  except	  wool	  fabrics	   	   	   1890	  229	   Miscellaneous	  textile	  goods	   	   	   1895	  230	   Apparel	  and	  other	  finished	  products	  made	  from	  fabrics	  and	  similar	  materials	   	   	   1910	  231	   Men's	  and	  boys'	  suits,	  coats,	  and	  overcoats	   	   1860	   	  232	   Men's	  and	  boys'	  furnishings,	  work	  clothing,	  and	  allied	  garments	   	   1880	   	  233	   Women's,	  misses',	  and	  juniors'	  outerwear	   	   1860	   	  235	   Hats,	  caps,	  and	  millinery	   	   	   1900	  236	   Girls',	  children's,	  and	  infants'	  outerwear	   	   1870	   	  242	   Sawmills	  and	  planing	  mills	   	   	   1890	  243	   Millwork,	  veneer,	  plywood,	  and	  structural	  wood	   	   	   1890	  244	   Wood	  containers	   	   	   1905	  249	   Miscellaneous	  wood	  products	   	   	   1890	  250	   Furniture	  and	  fixtures	   	   1870	   	  251	   Household	  furniture	   	   	   1890	  254	   Partitions,	  shelving,	  lockers,	  and	  office	  and	  store	  fixtures	   	   1860	   	  259	   Miscellaneous	  furniture	  and	  fixtures	   	   1860	   	  260	   Paper	  and	  allied	  products	   	   	   1895	  271	   Newspapers:	  publishing,	  or	  publishing	  and	  printing	   	   1870	   	  273	   Books	   	   1870	   	  277	   Greeting	  cards	   	   1860	   	  285	   Paints,	  varnishes,	  lacquers,	  enamels,	  and	  allied	  products	   	   	   1890	  287	   Agricultural	  chemicals	   	   1860	   1890	  289	   Miscellaneous	  chemical	  products	   	   	   1895	  295	   Asphalt	  paving	  and	  roofing	  materials	   	   1860	   1910	  299	   Miscellaneous	  products	  of	  petroleum	  and	  coal	   	   	   1890	  300	   Rubber	  and	  miscellaneous	  plastics	  products	   	   	   1900	  302	   Rubber	  and	  plastics	  footwear	   	   1880	   	  305	   Gaskets,	  packing,	  and	  sealing	  devices	  and	  rubber	   	   1880	   	  306	   Fabricated	  rubber	  products,	  not	  elsewhere	   	   1860	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308	   Miscellaneous	  plastics	  products	   	   1880	   	  322	   Glass	  and	  glassware,	  pressed	  or	  blown	   	   1860	   1890	  323	   Glass	  products,	  made	  of	  purchased	  glass	   	   1860	   	  324	   Cement,	  hydraulic	   	   	   1890	  325	   Structural	  clay	  products	   	   	   1890	  328	   Cut	  stone	  and	  stone	  products	   	   	   1890	  329	   Abrasive,	  asbestos,	  and	  miscellaneous	  nonmetallic	  mineral	  products	   	   	   1900	  330	   Primary	  metal	  industries	   	   	   1895	  331	   Steel	  works,	  blast	  furnaces,	  and	  rolling	  and	  finishing	  mills	   	   	   1890	  332	   Iron	  and	  steel	  foundries	   	   	   1895	  333	   Primary	  smelting	  and	  refining	  of	  nonferrous	  metals	   	   	   1900	  334	   Secondary	  smelting	  and	  refining	  of	  nonferrous	  metals	   	   1860	   	  335	   Rolling,	  drawing,	  and	  extruding	  of	  nonferrous	  metals	   	   1860	   	  343	   Heating	  equipment,	  except	  electric	  and	  warm	  air	   	   	   1910	  347	   Coating,	  engraving,	  and	  allied	  services	   	   	   1910	  349	   Miscellaneous	  fabricated	  metal	  products	   	   	   1910	  350	   Industrial	  and	  commercial	  machinery	  and	  computer	  equipment	   	   1870	   	  352	   Farm	  and	  garden	  machinery	  and	  equipment	   	   	   1890	  353	   Construction,	  mining,	  and	  materials	  handling	   	   1860	   	  354	   Metalworking	  machinery	  and	  equipment	   	   1860	   1900	  357	   Computer	  and	  office	  equipment	   	   1880	   	  358	   Refrigeration	  and	  service	  industry	  machinery	   	   1860	   	  359	   Miscellaneous	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  equipment	   	   1860	   1890	  360	   Electronic	  and	  other	  electrical	  equipment	  and	  components,	  except	  computer	  equipment	   	   1860	   	  362	   Electrical	  industrial	  apparatus	   	   1880	   1905	  364	   Electric	  lighting	  and	  wiring	  equipment	   	   	   1890	  365	   Household	  audio	  and	  video	  equipment,	  and	  audio	  media	   	   1900	   	  370	   Transportation	  equipment	   	   	   1890	  371	   Motor	  vehicles	  and	  motor	  vehicle	  equipment	   	   	   1900	  373	   Ship	  and	  boat	  building	  and	  repairing	   	   	   1890	  374	   Railroad	  equipment	   	   	   1905	  382	   Laboratory	  apparatus	  and	  analytical,	  optical,	  measuring,	  and	  controlling	  instruments	   	   	   1890	  387	   Watches,	  clocks,	  clockwork	  operated	  devices,	  and	  parts	   	   	   1895	  394	   Dolls,	  toys,	  games	  and	  sporting	  and	  athletic	  goods	   	   1860	   	  395	   Pens,	  pencils,	  and	  other	  artists	  materials	   	   	   1900	  	  Source:	  United	  States	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget	  (1987)	  and	  author's	  calculations.	  Years	  are	  rounded	  forward	  on	  a	  five-­‐yearly	  basis	  for	  Japanese	  industries.	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Figure	  1:	  Number	  of	  New	  SIC3	  Industries	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Japan	  	  
	  	   Source:	  see	  text	  	  	  	  	   Figure	  2:	  Survival	  Curves	  of	  New	  Industry	  Appearance	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Japan	  	  
	  	   Source:	  see	  text.
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   Table	  1:	  Industrial	  Development	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Japan	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  United	  States	   1850	   1860	   1870	   1880	   1890	   1900	   1910	  	  	  	  GDP	  (mil)	   $2,581	   $4,387	   $7,812	   $10,462	   $15,223	   $20,766	   $33,746	  	  	  	  Population	  (mil)	   23.3	   31.5	   39.9	   50.3	   63.1	   76.1	   92.4	  	  	  	  Manufacturing	  Industries	   251	   605	   383	   277	   305	   314	   256	  	  	  	  	  	  	  SIC3	  Sectors	   95	   108	   109	   105	   107	   107	   101	  	  	  	  	  	  	  New	  SIC3	  Sectors	   	   19	   7	   6	   0	   1	   0	  	  	  	  Firms	   114,774	   128,574	   230,330	   176,788	   200,128	   207,176	   268,440	  	  	  	  Average	  Firm	  Capital	   $4,234	   $7,279	   $8,980	   $15,255	   $30,348	   $43,201	   $71,815	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Japan	   	   1885	   1890	   1895	   1900	   1905	   1910	  	  	  	  GNE	  (mil)	   	   $9.6	   $12.6	   $30.7	   $49.0	   $62.5	   $79.5	  	  	  	  Population	  (mil)	   	   38.3	   39.9	   41.6	   43.8	   46.6	   49.2	  	  	  	  Manufacturing	  Industries	   	   24	   48	   52	   73	   82	   93	  	  	  	  	  	  	  SIC3	  Sectors	   	   18	   37	   39	   49	   52	   58	  	  	  	  	  	  	  New	  SIC3	  Sectors	   	   	   20	   9	   10	   3	   5	  	  	  	  Firms	   	   498	   2,055	   831	   2,344	   2,325	   3,489	  	  	  	  Average	  Firm	  Capital	   	   $99	   $190	   $1,063	   $1,602	   $1,261	   $2,181	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Source:	  see	  text.	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Table	  2:	  Duration	  Model	  Results	  for	  New	  Industry	  Appearance	  DV:	  Log(Years	  to	  New	  SIC3	  Industry)	   A	   B	   C	   D	   E	  Log(Per	  Capita	  Income)	  (Current	  US$)	   0.138	  (0.106)	   0.284***	  (0.102)	   0.263***	  (0.102)	   0.374***	  (0.116)	   0.339	  (0.261)	  Country	  Fixed	  Effect	  (Japan	  =	  1)	   0.481	  (0.615)	   1.242**	  (0.592)	   0.957	  (0.610)	   1.820**	  (0.717)	   1.531	  (2.113)	  Average	  Firm	  Capitalization	  (Current	  US$)	   	   -­‐0.007***	  (0.001)	   -­‐0.007***	  (0.001)	   -­‐0.008***	  (0.001)	   -­‐0.008***	  (0.001)	  Capital	  Share	  of	  Related	  SIC3	  Industries	  (%)	   	   	   -­‐0.056**	  (0.027)	   -­‐0.057**	  (0.028)	   -­‐0.055**	  (0.028)	  SIC3	  Capital	  Intensity	   	   	   	   0.015***	  (0.006)	   0.015***	  (0.005)	  Country	  F.E.	  x	  Average	  Firm	  Capitalization	   	   -­‐0.177***	  (0.042)	   -­‐0.175***	  (0.043)	   -­‐0.164***	  (0.038)	   -­‐0.164***	  (0.038)	  Country	  F.E.	  x	  Related	  SIC3	  Capital	  Share	   	   	   0.057**	  (0.028)	   0.057**	  (0.028)	   0.055**	  (0.028)	  Country	  F.E.	  x	  SIC3	  Capital	  Intensity	   	   	   	   -­‐1.535**	  (0.702)	   -­‐1.529**	  (0.705)	  Year	  trend	   	   	   	   	   0.003	  (0.020)	  Constant	   2.370***	  (0.555)	   1.780***	  (0.535)	   2.048***	  (0.554)	   1.479**	  (0.621)	   -­‐4.252	  (35.993)	  	   	   	   	   	   	  Net	  Effect	  (Japan)	   	   1.002*	  (0.607)	   0.723	  (0.624)	   1.286*	  (0.692)	   0.998	  (2.094)	  Total	  Industries/Event	  Occurrence	   80/80	   80/80	   80/80	   80/80	   80/80	  Observations	   160	   160	   160	   160	   160	  Log	  Pseudolikelihood	   294.167	   299.951	   300.634	   302.438	   302.451	  Chi-­‐squared	  Statistic	   201.87***	   185.98***	   158.83***	   577.21***	   603.11***	  Significance	  levels:	  *10%,	  **5%,	  ***1%.	  Source:	  see	  text.	  All	  specifications	  use	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  SIC3	  industry	  and	  country	  (in	  parentheses).	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Table	  3:	  Duration	  Model	  Results	  for	  Industry	  Growth	  DV:	  Log(Years	  to	  0.5%	  Mfg.	  Capital	  Stock)	   A	   B	   C	   D	   E	  Log(Per	  Capita	  Income)	  (Current	  US$)	   -­‐0.773***	  (0.155)	   -­‐0.621***	  (0.162)	   -­‐0.671***	  (0.178)	   -­‐0.572***	  (0.188)	   -­‐0.390*	  (0.231)	  Country	  Fixed	  Effect	  (Japan	  =	  1)	   -­‐5.512***	  (0.978)	   -­‐4.657***	  (1.026)	   -­‐5.097***	  (1.210)	   -­‐5.156***	  (1.270)	   -­‐3.791**	  (1.596)	  Average	  Firm	  Capitalization	  (Current	  US$)	   	   -­‐0.001***	  (0.0003)	   -­‐0.001***	  (0.0003)	   0.001	  (0.001)	   0.0005	  (0.001)	  Capital	  Share	  of	  Related	  SIC3	  Industries	  (%)	   	   	   -­‐0.009	  (0.021)	   -­‐0.018	  (0.023)	   -­‐0.022	  (0.024)	  SIC3	  Capital	  Intensity	   	   	   	   -­‐1.183***	  (0.348)	   -­‐1.015***	  (0.380)	  Country	  F.E.	  x	  Average	  Firm	  Capitalization	   	   -­‐0.054*	  (0.029)	   -­‐0.050	  (0.032)	   -­‐0.054*	  (0.031)	   -­‐0.059*	  (0.031)	  Country	  F.E.	  x	  Related	  SIC3	  Capital	  Share	   	   	   0.016	  (0.022)	   0.024	  (0.024)	   0.028	  (0.025)	  Country	  F.E.	  x	  SIC3	  Capital	  Intensity	   	   	   	   0.711	  (0.763)	   0.496	  (0.759)	  Year	  trend	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.010	  (0.009)	  Constant	   7.451***	  (0.878)	   6.735***	  (0.902)	   7.044***	  (1.026)	   7.251***	  (1.073)	   25.499	  (15.873)	  	   	   	   	   	   	  Net	  Effect	  (Japan)	   	   -­‐4.755***	  (1.006)	   -­‐5.110***	  (1.153)	   -­‐5.286***	  (1.191)	   -­‐3.948***	  (1.534)	  Total	  Industries/Event	  Occurrence	   74/74	   74/74	   74/74	   74/74	   74/74	  Observations	   336	   336	   336	   336	   336	  Log	  Pseudolikelihood	   265.231	   267.619	   267.901	   270.563	   270.927	  Chi-­‐squared	  Statistic	   47.87***	   92.51***	   90.37***	   88.51***	   85.04***	  Significance	  levels:	  *10%,	  **5%,	  ***1%.	  Source:	  see	  text.	  All	  specifications	  use	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  SIC3	  industry	  and	  country	  (in	  parentheses).	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   Table	  4:	  Robustness	  Check,	  Varying	  Periods	  of	  Analysis	  	  DV:	  Log(Years	  to	  Event	  Occurrence)	   	   A	  New	  Industry	   B	  0.5%	  Capital	   C	  New	  Industry	   D	  0.5%	  Capital	  Log(Per	  Capita	  Income)	  (Current	  US$)	   	   0.266	  (0.314)	   0.339	  (0.261)	   -­‐0.323	  (0.238)	   -­‐0.489**	  (0.241)	  Country	  Fixed	  Effect	  (Japan	  =	  1)	   	   0.992	  (2.493)	   1.531	  (2.113)	   -­‐3.407**	  (1.627)	   -­‐5.024***	  (1.788)	  Average	  Firm	  Capitalization	  (Current	  US$)	   	   -­‐0.008***	  (0.002)	   -­‐0.008***	  (0.001)	   0.0005	  (0.001)	   -­‐0.004	  (0.004)	  Capital	  Share	  of	  Related	  SIC3	  Industries	  (%)	   	   -­‐0.138	  (0.095)	   -­‐0.055**	  (0.028)	   -­‐0.038	  (0.035)	   -­‐0.020	  (0.023)	  SIC3	  Capital	  Intensity	   	   0.017***	  (0.006)	   0.015***	  (0.005)	   -­‐0.974***	  (0.353)	   -­‐1.017**	  (0.456)	  Country	  F.E.	  x	  Average	  Firm	  Capitalization	   	   -­‐0.156***	  (0.038)	   -­‐0.164***	  (0.038)	   -­‐0.058*	  (0.033)	   -­‐0.065**	  (0.031)	  Country	  F.E.	  x	  Related	  SIC3	  Capital	  Share	   	   0.138	  (0.095)	   0.055**	  (0.028)	   0.043	  (0.036)	   0.024	  (0.024)	  Country	  F.E.	  x	  SIC3	  Capital	  Intensity	   	   -­‐1.405*	  (0.724)	   -­‐1.529**	  (0.705)	   0.474	  (0.743)	   0.269	  (0.769)	  Year	  trend	   	   -­‐0.003	  (0.027)	   0.003	  (0.020)	   -­‐0.016	  (0.012)	   0.011	  (0.012)	  Constant	   	   7.002	  (48.444)	   -­‐4.252	  (35.993)	   36.687	  (22.850)	   -­‐14.128	  (21.601)	  Period	  of	  analysis	  (U.S.)	   	   1860-­‐1910	   1860-­‐1910	   1850-­‐1900	   1850-­‐1900	  Net	  Effect	  (Japan)	   	   0.493	  (2.475)	   0.998	  (2.094)	   -­‐3.560**	  (1.564)	   -­‐5.260***	  (1.745)	  Total	  Industries/Event	  Occurrence	   	   61/61	   80/80	   62/62	   74/64	  Observations	   	   122	   160	   236	   324	  Log	  Pseudolikelihood	   	   235.420	   302.451	   236.632	   227.395	  Chi-­‐squared	  Statistic	   	   1022.33***	   603.11***	   72.56***	   64.32***	  Significance	  levels:	  *10%,	  **5%,	  ***1%.	  Source:	  see	  text.	  All	  specifications	  use	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  SIC3	  industry	  and	  country	  (in	  parentheses).	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Table	  5:	  Robustness	  Check,	  Higher	  Total	  Capital	  Stock	  Threshold	  DV:	  Log(Years	  to	  1%	  Mfg.	  Capital	  Stock)	   A	   B	   C	   D	   E	  Log(Per	  Capita	  Income)	  (Current	  US$)	   -­‐0.005	  (0.243)	   0.314	  (0.232)	   0.284	  (0.244)	   0.313	  (0.290)	   0.730*	  (0.378)	  Country	  Fixed	  Effect	  (Japan	  =	  1)	   0.306	  (1.374)	   1.940	  (1.346)	   1.745	  (1.433)	   1.354	  (1.767)	   4.405*	  (2.462)	  Average	  Firm	  Capitalization	  (Current	  US$)	   	   -­‐0.005***	  (0.001)	   -­‐0.005***	  (0.001)	   -­‐0.004***	  (0.001)	   -­‐0.003***	  (0.001)	  Capital	  Share	  of	  Related	  SIC3	  Industries	  (%)	   	   	   -­‐0.033	  (0.024)	   -­‐0.051**	  (0.026)	   -­‐0.055*	  (0.029)	  SIC3	  Capital	  Intensity	   	   	   	   -­‐0.750**	  (0.370)	   -­‐0.465	  (0.425)	  Country	  F.E.	  x	  Average	  Firm	  Capitalization	   	   -­‐0.187**	  (0.083)	   -­‐0.182**	  (0.082)	   -­‐0.187**	  (0.081)	   -­‐0.197**	  (0.081)	  Country	  F.E.	  x	  Related	  SIC3	  Capital	  Share	   	   	   0.015	  (0.026)	   0.033	  (0.027)	   0.036	  (0.030)	  Country	  F.E.	  x	  SIC3	  Capital	  Intensity	   	   	   	   0.848	  (1.079)	   0.430	  (1.137)	  Year	  trend	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.023*	  (0.012)	  Constant	   3.551***	  (1.321)	   2.156*	  (1.244)	   2.520*	  (1.348)	   2.910*	  (1.561)	   44.242**	  (21.981)	  	   	   	   	   	   	  Net	  Effect	  (Japan)	   	   1.727	  (1.330)	   1.387	  (1.422)	   1.010	  (1.634)	   4.020*	  (2.330)	  Total	  Industries/Event	  Occurrence	   84/52	   84/52	   84/52	   84/52	   84/52	  Observations	   410	   410	   410	   410	   410	  Log	  Pseudolikelihood	   150.024	   158.468	   159.879	   160.780	   161.964	  Chi-­‐squared	  Statistic	   1.97	   58.99***	   64.03***	   93.32***	   109.69***	  Significance	  levels:	  *10%,	  **5%,	  ***1%.	  Source:	  see	  text.	  All	  specifications	  use	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  SIC3	  industry	  and	  country	  (in	  parentheses).	  	  	  
